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Abstract 
 
Although many aspects of life exist on a continuum (e.g., color, intelligence, skin pigmentation), 
distinct classifications are made to distinguish between different categories of each concept. 
Moral judgments are similarly split; instead of a smooth continuum from good to evil, the moral 
landscape is perceived as discontinuous. A series of five online studies examine the discontinuity 
of moral judgments. Non-moral judgments of intimacy, pain, theft, fetal development and torture 
were predicted to follow a linear trend while moral judgments of these actions were predicted to 
be curvilinear. The studies demonstrate that moral judgments of intimacy, fetal development and 
torture are discontinuous; a moral cliff exists where the judgment of certain actions changes from 
good to bad. Possible mechanisms and implications responsible for the moral cliff include moral 
polarization, moral convictions and the idea of a slippery slope of morality.  
.   
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Moral Cliff: The Discontinuity of Moral Judgment 
“That crossed the line!” “You have gone too far!” “I’ve overstepped my bounds!” These 
phrases are often heard in the context of wrongdoing. Why is it that metaphors such as these are 
often the first to come to mind when morality is involved? Our use of the English language 
draws attention to the discrete manner in which moral actions are distinguished from immoral 
ones. We all know that we live in a world that is not strictly black and white; life contains many 
nuances and shades of grey. However, in relation to morality, people often fail to perceive these 
nuances. In a more visual manner, the moral input all of us receive from our environment is 
continuous, but once moral judgments are formed the moral outputs become discontinuous (see 
Figure 1). Moral judgments may contain a moral cliff or discrete moment when an immorality 
judgment is made. In the following five studies, we investigate the existence of discontinuous 
moral judgments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Demonstration of continuous moral input and discontinuous moral output 
 
Many aspects of life exist on a continuum. The transition from black to white goes 
through the color grey, although it is hard to distinguish when that conversion actually occurs. 
Children grow into adults and continue maturing. Yet it is difficult to isolate a distinct moment at 
which a person becomes an “adult,” because human growth is a gradual progression. 
MORAL CLIFF 5 
Furthermore, a friendship can evolve into a romantic relationship, but the exact time that feelings 
develop is often hard to determine. Yet people tend to form distinct classifications of continuous 
items, such as black or white, child or adult and friendly or romantic. We predict that more than 
many things, matters of good and evil seem to be categorized on two distinct poles: black or 
white, but rarely indeterminately grey. The dead go either to heaven or hell; people are either 
sinners or saints; and governmental policies are just or unjust, not only useful or misguided. 
Individuals make moral judgments every day, consciously or not. Moral judgments are split; 
instead of a smooth continuum from good to evil, the moral landscape is discontinuous, with 
judgments of acts clustering at the peaks of righteousness and in the valleys of sin. In this paper, 
we examine whether the output of moral judgment is more discontinuous than the input of the 
non-moral content.  
The Need to Categorize  
Moral judgments are formed to evaluate the ethical nature of an action and to ascribe 
virtue or blame for that action as appropriate. Moreover, they serve as a manner of 
categorization. Humans compartmentalize people, actions, behaviors and decisions in order to 
maintain order and establish meaning in the world. Initial impressions, which are automatic, are 
based on our categorizations of others’ gender, age, race and appearance, among other attributes. 
Forming distinctions and identifying differences and similarities between people are human 
approaches to reducing ambiguity in the world, especially given a situation containing limited or 
imperfect information, as many moral circumstances may (Fiske, 1993).  
Given this need to reduce ambiguity, people are subject to the ‘tyranny of the 
discontinuous mind’ (Dawkins 2013), forming judgments in an all-or-nothing manner. Dawkins 
initially applied this phrase to the concept of evolution. Genetic code is extremely diverse and 
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overlaps between various organisms, yet we form categorizations of species within it. Although 
genetic code is a continuous entity, we see discrete differences between a man and a monkey. 
With the input of genetic code, the categorization of animals into species is the discontinuous 
output.  
The categorization of species is an instance of arbitrary distinctions we form. Intelligence 
is another example. This spring, the Supreme Court will determine whether the State of Florida 
can execute Freddie Hall, a convicted killer who has been deemed “mentally retarded” 
(Sherman, 2014). Intelligence exists on a continuum and measurements of IQ are fraught with 
error and ambiguity, but for the state of Florida there is a clear line. If Hall’s IQ is below 70, he 
will live; if it is above this strict cutoff, he will die. An IQ test as a determinant of mental 
capacity is an example of the tyranny of the discontinuous mind and one that, in this case, 
determines life or death. A judgment of moral responsibility will determine Freddie Hall’s guilt 
or innocence.  
Failure to Perceive Ambiguity in Abstract Judgment 
The influence of categorization has been demonstrated in abstract judgments through 
color perception tasks. When participants were presented with a color gradient, those who had 
been primed to be in a categorical mindset saw more distinct colors on the gradient. Those 
primed with a continuous mindset saw more similar colors. In these studies, the mindsets of the 
participants also affected their moral judgment. Participants read about a scenario involving 
gradually escalating behavior that eventually lead to rape. Those in a categorical mindset judged 
the rapist as more blameworthy, compared to the participants in the continuous mindset who did 
not see the perpetrator’s end behavior to be as immoral (Hartson & Sherman, 2012). We 
hypothesize that when forming moral judgments, an intuitive categorical mindset is utilized. 
MORAL CLIFF 7 
Actions or situations are perceived as black or white, but rarely the intermediate color of grey. A 
moral judgment gradient is dichotomized.   
Racial Categorization 
 The limits of categorization have been well-documented in research on race and racial 
prejudice. Skin pigmentation exists on a continuum but is often viewed categorically. People are 
seen as Black, White, Hispanic, etc., not as a combination of multiple races. The concept of 
hypodescent (Harris, 1992), where the race of a mixed-race child is often identified as the race of 
the ‘socially subordinate’ parent, intriguingly demonstrates people’s intrinsic need to categorize. 
Even when others do not fall into a distinct racial category, people still categorize them into 
discrete categories. For example, Peery and Bodenhausen (2008) conducted a study where 
participants rapidly classified racially-ambiguous faces into either White/not White or Black/not 
Black categories. When no parental or demographic information was available, participants 
identified more racially-ambiguous faces as Black more frequently than White. Judgments are 
quickly formed about people’s race even when they do not fall into a distinct racial category. 
With a continuous input of skin pigmentation, the discontinuous output is racial categorization. 
In fact, the need for categorization is so strong that situations that challenge people’s 
ability to categorize are experienced as aversive. In a recent study by Halberstadt and 
Wiknielman (2014), participants rated the attractiveness of bi-racial individuals’ faces. Faces that 
were easily classified as either distinctly Black or White were rated as more attractive than faces 
that fell into a racially ambiguous middle ground. A face that was harder to categorize into its 
components was generally more disliked (Halberstadt & Winkielman, 2014; see also Chen & 
Hamilton, 2012; Ho, Sidanius, Levin, & Banaji, 2011). This research demonstrates that even 
though people are aware of multiracial ethnicities, increasingly common in the United States, 
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individuals still desire to classify multiracial people in one specific racial category as opposed to 
a combination of multiple races. People feel more comfortable when they can categorize an 
ambiguous entity, such as a bi-racial face, into a well-defined grouping.   
 We predict that moral judgments follow a discontinuous pattern, similar to 
categorizations of racial perception. Ethical gradients and degrees exist, but judgments about 
ethical issues are strictly divided between moral and immoral. This reality is seen through the 
moral issues that define our political landscape and often divide our country (Haidt, 2012; Skitka 
et al., 2005). The abortion debate continues between pro-choice and pro-life advocates, and 
many individuals support the death penalty while others think it should be outlawed. Same-sex 
marriage, gun control and the legalization of marijuana are powerful examples of political 
disputes intrinsically tied to personal views of morality. These ‘hot topic’ issues involve multiple 
perspectives with no definitively “true” answer; nonetheless people confidently make absolute 
judgments of right and wrong. 
Moral Typecasting 
Our tendency to categorize is also evident in the domain of moral typecasting, which 
involves classifying doers and receivers of actions. Although we know that a person could be 
both a moral agent, the “doer” of good or evil actions, and a moral patient, the “[recipient] of 
good/evil”, when moral actions are judged, someone is identified as either the perpetrator or the 
victim, but never both (Gray & Wegner, 2009). Analogous to the concept of moral typecasting is 
one’s perception of the well-known reversible figure illustration, “My Wife and My Mother-in-
Law” (see Figure 2), which depicts both a young woman and an old, witchlike woman (Boring, 
1930). Although two images exist in this figure, an individual cannot see both women 
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simultaneously. A mind naturally distinguishes between the young woman and the crone, similar 
to how individuals develop divergent moral typecasts of patient and agent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. “My Wife and My Mother-in-Law”  
 
A real-world instance of the duality of moral typecasting is that of George Zimmerman. 
Two years ago Zimmerman fatally shot 17-year-old Trayvon Martin. The details of the case are 
still ambiguous. Only Zimmerman knows what transpired between Martin and him, and public 
opinion remains divided.  Supporters of Zimmerman believe that he acted in self-defense, 
identifying him as a moral patient (Francescani, 2013), while opponents believe Zimmerman 
wantonly murdered young Martin, casting him as a moral agent and a ruthless vigilante (Lawson, 
2012). Therefore, the manner in which one distinguishes between moral agents and moral 
patients parallels the distinctions one makes in our moral judgments.   
The grouping of colors, the classification of race and moral typecasting are examples of 
an overarching human tendency to perceive the world in discontinuous terms. Evidence seems to 
suggest that this extends to the moral domain as well. These studies will expand the scientific 
understanding of morality by illustrating systematic biases in our moral judgments of others and 
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peoples’ reactions to events. The research can also be extended to real-world situations by 
investigating why compromise is often so hard to achieve when contentious topics are at issue 
and why political polarization is so powerful. In summary, we predict that the moral landscape is 
curved; moral judgments of actions are either distinctly good or distinctly bad. This claim will be 
investigated through a series of five online surveys. 
Current Research 
Five studies investigated the curved nature of the moral landscape.  We tested whether 
non-moral judgments of intimacy (study 1), pain (study 2), theft (study 3), fetal development 
(study 4) and torture (study 5) proceed linearly, whereas moral judgments of these actions are 
curvilinear. These five acts where chosen because they all contain both moral and non-moral 
components. Additionally, all five acts span a diversity of moral concerns that are often relevant 
to people’s lives. We predict that for increasing magnitudes of each act, non-moral judgments 
will proceed linearly while moral judgments would be curved.   
Study 1: Intimacy 
Participants 
One hundred and eighty-eight participants completed the study through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk). Participants earned $0.25 a study. Internet samples are frequently 
used in psychological research (Skitka & Sargis, 2006), and mTurk recruitment maintains 
reliability equal to that of lab-based populations (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). 
Participants were excluded if they failed attention checks (e.g. instructional manipulation checks; 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) or if they failed to follow instructions. Of the initial 
188 participants, 31 people failed the attention check, leaving 157 participants (43% female, 57% 
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male). The mean age of the participants was around 32. All the participants were from the United 
States.   
Procedure 
 This study tested the difference between perceptions of intimacy and immorality through 
a 2 (relationship status: single vs. married) x 2 (question: morality vs. intimacy) between-
subjects design. Participants were instructed to read a short vignette about Joe and Kate who 
become friends at a networking night and then engage in ten increasing acts of intimacy, from 
becoming Facebook friends, texting each other, and going out to dinner and to kissing 
passionately. To manipulate the morality of the act, participants were told that Joe and Kate are 
both either single or happily married to other people. Additionally, after each action, participants 
made either a moral judgment (“How immoral is this action?”) or an intimacy judgment (“How 
intimate is this action?”) on a 5-point Likert scale from “Not at All” (1) to “Extremely” (5). After 
rating all ten actions, participants completed demographics questions including age, gender, 
country, and political leaning, measured on a scale from “Strongly Liberal” (1) to “Strongly 
Conservative” (7).  
The Institutional Review Board of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
approved this study design and all further studies, and participant consent was obtained at the 
beginning of each survey.  
Study 1 Results 
Data Analysis Plan 
 Since acts were designed to increase in intensity, in this and all subsequent studies, acts 
were treated as a continuous variable. If moral judgments are discontinuous, we predict that in 
addition to a linear trend, a curvilinear trend between action intensity and rating will exist in the 
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moral but not non-moral condition. To test this, the linear, quadratic and then cubic terms were 
entered into a stepwise regression, and we tested whether the cubic trend had a significant R2 
change.  
For this study’s results, all four conditions were run; however, the key comparison exists 
between the single intimacy condition and the married immoral condition. The single immoral 
condition displayed little variance between judgments (see Figure 3) and the married intimacy 
condition contained a slight moral component acting as a hybrid between the morality and 
intimacy conditions.  
Non-moral Condition  
Linear: In the single intimacy condition, the linear trend accounts for 69% of the 
variance in ratings, F(1, 348) = 780.67, p < .001.  
Curvilinear: The addition of the quadratic, R2 change = .002, and cubic, R2 change < 
.001, terms did not significantly increase the variance explained in the model. With regard to the 
intimacy question, actions followed a clear linear trend.   
Moral Condition  
Linear: For immorality, the linear trend accounted for a significant amount of variance in 
the model, R2 = .56, F(1, 398) = 780.67, p < .001.  
Curvilinear: The addition of the quadratic, R2 change = .014, F(1, 397) = 12.53, p < 
.001,  and cubic, R2 change= .008, F(1, 396) = 7.83, p = .005, terms significantly improved the 
amount of variance explained.  As predicted, immorality followed a monotonic trend, but once 
this trend was accounted for, the data followed a non-linear, cubic pattern.  
Multi-Level Model: Since the data are nested within person, the model was run as a 
multi-level model with act nested within person and yielded similar results. Only the linear trend 
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significantly predicting the intimacy rating, β = .43, p < .001, not the quadratic or cubic terms, p 
> .80, but linear, β = -.51, p = .01, quadratic, β = -.17, p < .001, and the cubic, β = -.008, p = 
.001, model significantly predicted the immorality question.  
Discussion 
The moral judgments of married couples engaging in extramarital affairs were 
discontinuous. On average, participants in the married immoral condition thought that the act of 
holding hands (M = 3.34, SD = 1.21) was more immoral than previous intimacy actions, such as 
texting (M=1.57, SD = 0.98) and going out to dinner (M=2.06, SD = 1.14). Additionally, after 
the jump from moral to immoral occurred, the remaining intimacy actions were all judged as 
extremely immoral (see Figure 3). In contrast, the mean judgments in the single intimacy 
conditions followed a linear trend, gradually increasing as the acts became more intimate. Thus, 
a moral cliff exists for moral intimacy judgments.  
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Figure 3. The means of morality and intimacy judgments as a function of the type of intimacy 
occurring. 
 
Study 2: Pain 
Participants  
This study tested the difference between perceptions of pain and immorality through a 2 
(intention: intentional vs. accidental) x 2 (question: morality vs. painfulness) between-subjects 
design. 192 participants completed the survey through mTurk. Of the initial 192, 33 people failed 
the attention check, leaving 159 participants (41% female, 57% male and 2% of participants 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Jd
ug
m
en
t 
Intimacy Actions 
Married Intimate 
Single Intimate 
Married Immoral 
Single Immoral 
MORAL CLIFF 15 
chose not to respond). The average age of participants was around 32 years old. All were from 
the United States. 
Procedure 
Participants read a short vignette about John and Robert, two strangers waiting to order 
coffee at a local café. In a series of eight increasingly painful actions, John proceeds to engage 
with Robert, either accidentally or intentionally, from touching to nudging to pinching and 
finally punching Robert. After each action, participants made either a moral judgment (“How 
immoral is this action?”) or a judgment about the painfulness of the action (“How painful is this 
action for Robert?”) on a 5-point Likert scale from “Not at All” (1) to “Extremely” (5). 
Participants also completed demographics questions.  
Study 2 Results 
For the study results, all four conditions were analyzed, however, the key comparison 
existed between the intentional immoral condition and the accidental pain condition (Figure 3).  
Non-moral Condition 
Linear: In the accidental pain condition, the linear trend accounts for 57% of the 
variance in ratings, F(1, 278) = 374.00, p < .001.  
Curvilinear: The addition of the quadratic, R2 change = .025, p < .001, and cubic, R2 
change < .001, terms did not significantly increase the variance explained in the model. With 
regard to the painfulness question, actions followed a clear linear trend.   
Moral Condition  
Linear: For immorality, the linear trend accounted for a significant amount of variance in 
the model, R2 = .41, F(1, 358) = 250.93, p < .001.  
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Curvilinear: The addition of the quadratic, R2 change = .025, p < .001, and cubic, R2 
change= .001, p = .429, terms did not significantly improve the amount of variance explained.   
Discussion 
The results of the study did not support the hypothesis that non-moral judgments of pain 
would proceed linearly while moral judgments would be discontinuous. The means in every 
condition followed a linear trend, gradually increasing for both morality and painfulness 
judgments as the intensity of the action increased (see Figure 4).  It is possible that the pain study 
did not support the hypothesis because the pain actions described are not that severe relative to 
other painful acts. For instance, the act of flicking someone may not be perceived as that strong 
of a moral transgression.  
 
Figure 4. The means of morality and pain judgments as a function of the type of pain act and 
whether it was intentional or accidental.  
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Study 3: Theft 
Participants 
 This study tested the difference between perceptions of value and immorality through 
between-subjects design. 98 participants completed the survey through mTurk. Of the initial 98, 
3 failed the attention check, leaving 95 participants (42% female, 56% male and 2% of 
participants chose not to respond). The average age of participants was around 34 years old. All 
participants were from the United States.  
Procedure 
Participants read a short vignette about James, an employee at a large construction 
company. James is described as stealing ten different items of increasing value, from a pen to a 
computer from his office. After each action, participants made either a moral judgment (“How 
immoral is this action?”) or a judgment about the value of the item (“How valuable is this 
item?”) on a 5-point Likert scale from “Not at All” (1) to “Extremely” (5). Participants also 
completed demographics questions. 
Study 3 Results 
Non-moral Condition 
Linear: In the value condition, the linear trend accounts for 58% of the variance in 
ratings, F(1, 438) = 614.69, p < .001.  
Curvilinear: The addition of the quadratic, R2 change = .011, p < .001, and cubic, R2 
change < .001, terms did not significantly increase the variance explained in the model. With 
regard to the value question, actions followed a clear linear trend.   
Moral Condition  
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Linear: For immorality, the linear trend accounted for a significant amount of variance in 
the model, R2 = .50, F(1, 508) = 500.29, p < .001.  
Curvilinear: The addition of the quadratic, R2 change = .014, p < .001, and cubic, R2 
change= .001, p = .40, terms did not significantly improve the amount of variance explained.   
Discussion 
The results of the theft study did not support the hypothesis that non-moral judgments of 
value would proceed linearly while moral judgments would be discontinuous. The means in both 
conditions were practically identical, gradually increasing for both morality and value judgments 
as the value of the office item increased (see Figure 5). It is possible that this study did not 
support the hypothesis due to the relative lack of importance of the office supplies being stolen; 
participants simply did not care enough. The stolen items described were everyday items such as 
a paperclip. Perhaps if the stolen items were seen as more valuable, such as a painting by Pablo 
Picasso or an antique family ring, higher immorality ratings would exist. However, in this study, 
the immorality of theft paralleled the perceived value of each office item.  
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Figure 5. The means of morality and value judgments as a function of the type of office item 
being stolen.  
Study 4: Fetal Development  
This study was similar to Studies 1, 2 and 3, but tested participants perceptions of fetal 
development and the immorality of abortion.  
Participants 
Ninety-Six participants completed the survey through mTurk. Of the initial 96, 1 person 
failed the attention check, leaving 95 participants (43% female, 56% male and 1% of participants 
chose not to respond). The average age of the participants was around 32 years old. All 
participants were from the United States.  
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Procedure  
 This study tested the difference between perceptions of development and immorality 
through a between-subjects design. Participants saw a series of nine images of a fetus developing 
in a womb during each month of pregnancy. The images begin at month 1 and end in the ninth 
month of pregnancy. After each image, participants made either a moral judgment (“How 
immoral would it be to abort at this stage of development?”) or a judgment about the level of 
development of the fetus (“How developed is this fetus?”) on a 5-point Likert scale from “Not at 
All” (1) to “Extremely” (5). Participants rated all nine images and completed demographics 
questions including age, gender, country, and political orientation, measured on a scale from 
“Strongly Liberal” (1) to “Strongly Conservative” (2). Participants also answered questions 
concerning their viewpoints on abortion and questions about their acceptance of moral 
ambiguities from the Ethics Position Questionnaire.  
Study 4 Results 
         Abortion is a highly polarized topic, and graphs of the data revealed that there was a 
great deal of individual differences in the data set, especially in the moral condition.  Twenty-
three percent of participants in the moral condition viewed abortion as either always moral or 
never moral.  Additionally, participants who did increase their immorality rating varied on 
exactly where this shift occurred.  Given the degree of individual differences, a single regression 
line would fail to meaningfully capture the variance in the data. A simple Hierarchical Linear 
Model also would fail to fit the data as the predicted inflection points occur in different locations, 
requiring advance methods.1  To account for individual differences, regressions were run on each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	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  possible	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  is	  a	  spline	  MLM	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  that	  allows	  for	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  inflection	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  according	  to	  Patrick	  Curan	  and	  Laura	  Castro-­‐Schilo	  this	  analysis	  is	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  and	  often	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  to	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person’s responses, with the linear, quadratic and cubic terms predicting rating, and a test of 
model fit is the average effect size by condition by model.   
Non-moral Condition 
Linear: In the development condition, the linear trend had an average Cohen’s f 2 effect 
size of 9.92, 95% CI [9.81, 10.03]. 
 Curvilinear: The addition of the quadratic term reduced the effect size to 1.22, 95% CI 
[1.11, 1.35] and the cubic term to .40, 95% CI [0.27, 0.53].  
Moral Condition 
Linear: In the morality condition, the linear trend had an average Cohen’s f 2 effect size 
of 4.42, 95% CI [4.30, 4.55].  
Curvilinear: The effect size of the quadratic term was 2.09, 95% CI [1.95, 2.22] and the 
cubic term was .92, 95% CI [0.76, 1.06].  The linear model had a smaller effect size in 
comparison to the development condition, though the curvilinear terms fit better in the moral 
rather than the fetal development condition.   
Discussion  
The results of the abortion study supported the hypothesis that non-moral judgments of 
fetal development proceed linearly while moral judgments are discontinuous (see Figure 6 and 
Figure 7). 
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Figure 6. Eight randomly selected means of moral judgment as a function of fetal development.  
Figure 7. Eight randomly selected means of development judgment as a function of fetal 
development.  
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Study 5: Torture 
Participants 
This study tested the difference between perceptions of discomfort and immorality 
through a between-subjects (morality vs. discomfort) design. 98 participants completed the 
survey through mTurk. Of the initial 98, 4 failed the attention check, leaving 94 participants 
(44% female, 53% male and 3% chose not to respond). Average age of the participants was 
around 37 years old. All participants were from the United States.  
Procedure 
In the study, participants read a short vignette about United States soldiers who have 
captured an enemy combatant (see Appendix A). The enemy combatant has information that the 
soldiers need, so they decide to engage in ten escalating torturous acts, such as yelling, 
blindfolding and waterboarding the enemy combatant to retrieve the information. After each act, 
participants made either a moral judgment (“How immoral is this action”) or a judgment about 
the level of discomfort the enemy combatant feels (“How uncomfortable is this action for the 
enemy combatant”) on a 5-point Likert scale from “Not at All” (1) to “Extremely” (5). 
Participants also completed demographics questions, answered questions concerning their 
viewpoints on torture and questions about their acceptance of moral ambiguities from the Ethics 
Position Questionnaire.  
Study 5 Results 
Non-moral Condition 
Linear: In the discomfort condition, the linear trend accounts for 47% of the variance in 
ratings, F(1, 468) = 419.20, p < .001.  
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Curvilinear: The addition of the quadratic, R2 change = .005, p = .029, and cubic, R2 
change = .021, p < .001, terms did significantly increase the variance explained in the model. 
With regard to the discomfort question, actions followed a clear linear and curvilinear trend.  
Although this is a non-moral condition, the pattern found was consistent with the expected moral 
condition results.  
Moral Condition  
Linear: For immorality, the linear trend accounted for a significant amount of variance in 
the model, R2 = .45, F(1, 468) = 387.507, p < .001.  
Curvilinear: The addition of the quadratic, R2 change = .018, p < .001, and cubic, R2 
change= .009, p = .005, terms did significantly improve the amount of variance explained.   
Discussion 
The means in both the moral and non-moral judgment conditions follow a non-linear 
trend. A moral cliff occurred between the act of isolation (discomfort judgment: M=2.57, SD = 
1.02; immoral judgment: M = 1.79, SD = 1.18) and sleep deprivation (discomfort judgment: 
M=3.43, SD = 1.10; immoral judgments: M = 2.64, SD = 1.26). Both forms of judgment were 
continuous until reaching sleep deprivation, and then all subsequent torturous acts were rated as 
slightly or extremely immoral (see Figure 8). It is possible that the discomfort judgment followed 
a non-linear trend because torture as a form of pain is intrinsically tied to morality. The nature of 
morality centers on harm, or pain, caused to others, specifically a moral agent harming a moral 
patient.  As a result, painfulness and morality questions are perceived to be similar, thus creating 
a non-linear trend for both judgments (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012; Gray & Wegner, 2008). 
The discomfort questions were also asked in a moral context and did not focus exclusively on act 
intensity. Moreover, according to the concept of moral typecasting, the participants may have 
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identified the fictional enemy combatant as a moral patient suffering unnecessarily since they 
read the vignette from a distanced perspective (Gray & Wegner, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 8. The means of morality and discomfort judgments as a function of the type of torture 
occurring.  
 
General Discussion 
Summary 
Study 1 (Intimacy), Study 4 (Fetal Development) and Study 5 (Torture) exhibit the 
discontinuous nature of certain moral judgments. The non-moral judgments of intimacy and fetal 
development fit a linear trend while the moral judgments were discontinuous. The moral and 
non-moral judgments of torture were also discontinuous. Studies 2 and 3 did not support the 
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hypothesis of a discontinuous moral landscape. Study 2 (Pain) and Study 3 (Office Theft) 
displayed a linear trend for both moral and non-moral judgments potentially due to the relative 
lack of importance of the pain actions described and the office items stolen.  
Limitations 
The non-moral comparison questions in the intimacy, pain, theft and torture studies were 
cast in a moral light. To avoid this moral component, future studies should ask about the non-
moral acts by themselves without including descriptions of the vignettes they accompany. Within 
the torture study, although the non-moral condition did not ask a question about morality, the 
perception of torture/pain is intrinsically tied to morality, so both moral and non-moral 
judgments were similar. The non-moral condition of torture resulted in a curvilinear trend, 
instead of the predicted linear trend. Due to this condition’s moral component, a future 
investigation should rerun the study asking about the discomfort of each individual torture act 
without relation to an individual. If a linear trend is not found, a possibility remains that the ten 
torturous acts were not perceived as continuous.   
The results of the theft study were not significant possibly because the office items stolen 
were not extremely valuable, the least valuable item was a paperclip and the most valuable was a 
laptop. This study should be rerun with more valuable items. A reason why the pain study did 
not support our hypothesis could also correspond to the minimally painful acts described.  
Furthermore, these studies exclusively focus on acts, both non-moral and moral, and how 
these actions affect our interpretation of the moral landscape. This discontinuity may not hold 
true or may be manifested differently in relation to moral character. Therefore, future studies 
should investigate whether moral character judgments are discontinuous.  Additionally, the 
moral domain contains both good and bad acts (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009), but this 
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project focuses primarily on judgments related to bad acts. Moral judgments of good acts may 
not demonstrate the same dichotomy that some morally bad acts do.  
Strengths  
A significant strength of these series of studies was that the acts investigated - intimacy, 
pain, theft, fetal development and torture – can easily be varied by increasing magnitude, which 
is conducive to establishing a linear trend of non-moral judgments. Therefore, the uniqueness of 
the curvilinear morality condition could easily be demonstrated.  
Implications and Future Directions 
These studies are the first step in finding the existence of moral cliff. However, more 
research needs to be conducted to find the mechanism behind its occurrence. Potential 
mechanisms for certain discontinuous moral judgments and future research directions include 
moral polarization and moral convictions, the perception of a slippery slope of morality and a 
non-additive perception of moral character.  
The significant results of the intimacy, torture and fetal development studies have a 
variety of implications. Each of these moral issues – infidelity, torture and abortion – can lead to 
moral polarization between groups with opposing viewpoints (Greene, 2013). Judgments of 
morality cause individuals to more closely identify with the beliefs and values of their in-groups. 
Therefore, individuals may form moral judgments with a stronger belief in the correctness of 
their opinions and the errors of others, creating a more dichotomized view of the moral 
landscape.  
The moral issues of infidelity, torture and abortion are also well aligned with the concept 
of moral convictions, perhaps to a greater extent than acts of pain and theft are. Moral 
convictions (Skitka et al., 2005) or evaluations developed from an individual’s judgment of the 
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difference between right and wrong, are deeply rooted emotional feelings and values that align 
with one’s “sense of moral order” (Skitka, 2010, p. 270) in the world, such as the belief that 
abortion is immoral. In fact, the influence of moral convictions can be so strong that an 
individual will try to physically distance himself or herself from someone else with a conflicting 
belief (Skitka, 2010). The strength of these convictions might stem from the fact that the moral 
landscape is perceived to be unambiguous. Or the inverse could occur in which strong moral 
convictions may cause people to make more discontinuous moral judgments. Therefore, seeing 
the world as black and white might be both a cause and a consequence of moral convictions. 
Either way, this obstinacy coupled with moral polarization can impede compromise and limit 
perspective taking on various moral and political issues. Disputants may not perceive a common, 
middle ground. Therefore, future research should investigate the relationship between moral 
polarization, moral convictions and the moral landscape. Individual differences in moral 
convictions about a topic might amplify or mitigate the effect of a moral cliff. Manipulation of 
the moral conviction may strengthen the effect as well.  
Another implication from the significant results is that a slippery slope may exist for 
morality as it does in many political and legal spheres. The general principle of the slippery slope 
argument relates to the idea that the acceptance of one situation will eventually lead to a 
subsequent, more undesirable situation because no rational distinction can be made between the 
two situations (Burg, 1991). In relation to morality, people may believe that once an immoral act 
occurs or an action changes from moral to immoral, then all subsequent acts will also be 
immoral. Results from the fetal development study exemplify that once an individual decides 
that abortion is immoral, whether at one month of fetal development or five months, all 
subsequent months will also be judged as immoral.  
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Future research could investigate this concept by identifying if someone commits one bad 
action that person will be deemed more likely to commit additional bad actions (Freedman & 
Fraser, 1966). For instance, if John Doe cheats on his girlfriend, does that mean that he is more 
likely to cheat on his taxes as well? This could be tested within similar domains (i.e., cheating on 
girlfriend and cheating on taxes) or between different morally bad domains (i.e., identity fraud 
and cheating).  
Similarly, due to this perceived slippery slope of immorality, will the initial immoral act 
that a moral agent commits be judged more severely than subsequent bad actions committed? 
Based on the economic framework of diminishing marginal returns (Lane, 2000), the harshest 
moral judgment could exist from zero bad acts to one bad action; therefore, the third or fourth 
time an immoral action is committed may not be perceived to be as bad as the first time it was 
committed. For example, a future study could test if the second-time bank robber is considered 
“doubly evil” compared to a first time robber.  
Another future direction is to examine whether moral character judgments differ from 
moral act judgments by determining, for example the strength that a bad action has on moral 
character.  Specifically, is perception of moral character non-additive? Will an individual who 
commits a bad act and then a good act, either be seen as returning to a neutral moral character, or 
still be judged as exhibiting a negative moral character? To examine whether we dichotomize 
moral character judgments in addition to certain moral act judgments, a future study could 
identify how many good actions are needed to outweigh a bad action, if this is even possible at 
all (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). The directions for future studies 
mentioned above will build upon the curved nature of the moral landscape, further investigating 
the claim that certain moral judgments we form are either distinctly good or distinctly bad.  
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Conclusion 
Although morality, like IQ, color and skin pigmentation, is a continuous entity, many of 
our moral judgments are categorical. This project demonstrates that with moral issues closely 
tied to strong moral convictions, such as infidelity, abortion and torture, we dichotomize our 
moral judgments and form discrete judgments of good and bad. Even though the world exists in 
color, many moral issues are only seen in black and white.  
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Appendix A 
 
This is a portion of the Torture study including the moral and non-moral conditions.  
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Block 2
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. 
Immoral
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to yell at him to get the information. 
How immoral is this action?
Not at all Immoral Slightly Immoral Moderately Immoral Very Immoral Extremely Immoral
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to lie to him to get the information. 
How immoral is this action?
Not at all Immoral Slightly Immoral Moderately Immoral Very Immoral Extremely Immoral
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to blindfold him to get the information. 
How immoral is this action?
Not at all Immoral Slightly Immoral Moderately Immoral Very Immoral Extremely Immoral
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to tie him to a chair to get the information. 
How immoral is this action?
Not at all Immoral Slightly Immoral Moderately Immoral Very Immoral Extremely Immoral
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to isolate him to get the information. 
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he has. Therefore, they decide to isolate him to get the information. 
How immoral is this action?
Not at all Immoral Slightly Immoral Moderately Immoral Very Immoral Extremely Immoral
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to utilize sleep deprivation to get the information. 
How immoral is this action?
Not at all Immoral Slightly Immoral Moderately Immoral Very Immoral Extremely Immoral
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to engage in waterboarding to get the information. 
How immoral is this action?
Not at all Immoral Slightly Immoral Moderately Immoral Very Immoral Extremely Immoral
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to break some of his bones to get the information. 
How immoral is this action?
Not at all Immoral Slightly Immoral Moderately Immoral Very Immoral Extremely Immoral
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to utilize electric shock to get the information. 
How immoral is this action?
Not at all Immoral Slightly Immoral Moderately Immoral Very Immoral Extremely Immoral
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to engage in mutilation to get the information. 
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How immoral is this action?
Not at all Immoral Slightly Immoral Moderately Immoral Very Immoral Extremely Immoral
Comfort Level
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to yell at him to get the information. 
How uncomfortable is this action for the enemy combatant?
Not at all
Uncomfortable Slightly Uncomfortable
Moderately
Uncomfortable Very Uncomfortable
Extremely
Uncomfortable
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to lie to him to get the information. 
How uncomfortable is this action for the enemy combatant?
Not at all
Uncomfortable Slightly Uncomfortable
Moderately
Uncomfortable Very Uncomfortable
Extremely
Uncomfortable
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to blindfold him to get the information. 
How uncomfortable is this action for the enemy combatant?
Not at all
Uncomfortable Slightly Uncomfortable
Moderately
Uncomfortable Very Uncomfortable
Extremely
Uncomfortable
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to tie him to a chair to get the information. 
How uncomfortable is this action for the enemy combatant?
Not at all
Uncomfortable Slightly Uncomfortable
Moderately
Uncomfortable Very Uncomfortable
Extremely
Uncomfortable
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United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to isolate him to get the information. 
How uncomfortable is this action for the enemy combatant?
Not at all
Uncomfortable Slightly Uncomfortable
Moderately
Uncomfortable Very Uncomfortable
Extremely
Uncomfortable
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to utilize sleep deprivation to get the information. 
How uncomfortable is this action for the enemy combatant?
Not at all
Uncomfortable Slightly Uncomfortable
Moderately
Uncomfortable Very Uncomfortable
Extremely
Uncomfortable
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to engage in waterboarding to get the information. 
How uncomfortable is this action for the enemy combatant?
Not at all
Uncomfortable Slightly Uncomfortable
Moderately
Uncomfortable Very Uncomfortable
Extremely
Uncomfortable
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to break some of his bones to get the information. 
How uncomfortable is this action for the enemy combatant?
Not at all
Uncomfortable Slightly Uncomfortable
Moderately
Uncomfortable Very Uncomfortable
Extremely
Uncomfortable
United States soldiers have captured an enemy combatant. They want information that they know
he has. Therefore, they decide to utilize electric shock to get the information. 
How uncomfortable is this action for the enemy combatant?
Not at all Moderately Extremely
